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ACTION ACDA-19

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INFO USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

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USCINCEUR

S E C R E T VIENNA 9890

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: COMMENTS ON SPC VERIFICATION REPORT

REF: USNATO 5709

1. US MBFR DELEGATION HAS READ WITH INTEREST THE TEXT OF DRAFT SPC REPORT ON VERIFICATION AND MBFR IN REFTEL. WE FIND IT GENERALLY SOUND AND HELPFUL, AND ONE OF THE MOST REASONABLE APPROACHES TO HAVE EMERGED FROM ALLIANCE DISCUSSION IN THIS AREA. IN PARTICULAR, WE LIKE

THE STRESS ON THE WARNING FUNCTION OF NEGOTIATED INSPECTION MEASURES (IN PARA. 18) WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE ALLIES TO PLACE LESS EMPHASIS ON UNRESTRICTED ACCESS, GIVEN THE LOWER STRINGENCY REQUIRED FOR WARNING, AS OPPOSED TO MONITORING SPECIFIC MANPOWER LEVELS. PARAGRAPH 8 ALSO WOULD SEEM TO ESTABLISH AN IMPORTANT PRINCIPLE, AND THE

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THIRD SENTENCE OF THAT PARA SHOULD HELP LIMIT ALLIED OBJECTIONS TO

RECIPROCAL INSPECTION MEASURES.

2. ON THE WHOLE, THIS TENTATIVE NATO APPROACH WOULD SEEM TO US TO PROVIDE A BASIS ON WHICH THE US CAN NOW EXPLORE ACTIVELY HOW BEST TO WORK WITH OUR ALLIES IN ESTABLISHING APPROPRIATE MACHINERY WHICH WILL GIVE THEM THE NEEDED FEELING OF REAL PARTICIPATION WITH US IN THE MONITORING PROCESS, WHILE STILL SAFEGUARDING THE SECURITY OF NATIONAL MEANS. THUS, FOR EXAMPLE, THE OBSERVER TEAMS WHICH WOULD MONITOR REDUCTIONS AND PROVIDE WARNING OF CIRCUMVENTION, COULD BE A VEHICLE FOR THE ALLIED PARTICIPATION WHICH IS IMPORTANT FOR THE REASONS OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE SPC REPORT. MEETING THEIR LEGITIMATE CONCERNS IN THIS AREA SHOULD GREATLY FACILITATE ALLIED COOPERATION IN THE OVERALL VIENNA NEGOTIATING CONTEXT.

3. WE DO, HOWEVER, HAVE SOME TECHNICAL COMMENTS ON PARTICULAR POINTS,

AS INDICATED BELOW:

(A) PARAGRAPH 9 IMPOSES A REQUIREMENT TO SEEK OVERT INSPECTION OF MEASURES APPLYING OUTSIDE THE CENTRAL REGION. WHAT, IF ANY, MEASURES MIGHT ACTUALLY APPLY OUTSIDE THE CENTRAL REGION IS NOT DECID-

ED WITHIN THE USG OR NATO, AND AGREEING NOW THAT ANY SUCH MEASURES SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO INSPECTION WILL SURELY BE TROUBLESOME LATER.

(B) REGARDING THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 10, LIAISON OFFICERS ACCOMPANYING INSPECTION TEAMS WOULD, IF APPLIED TO MLMS AND ATTACHES, IMPOSE NEW CONTROLS ON THEM, SINCE THEY ARE, IN PRINCIPLE, UNACCOMPLISHED. IF WE CAN GET ALLIED INSPECTORS OR OBSERVERS IN PACT TERRITORY WITHOUT SUCH LIAISON REQUIREMENTS, DO WE WANT TO INSIST ON IT FOR PACT INSPECTORS? IN OTHER WORDS, THOUGH WE MIGHT HAVE TO ACCEPT SUCH A PROVISION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, IS IT WISE TO PROPOSE IT?

(C) PARAGRAPH 11. SINCE AGREEMENTS WOULD BE NEGOTIATED ON BEHALF OF INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS WHOSE REPRESENTATIVES WOULD BE INVOLVED IN VERIFICATION, WE SEE DIFFICULTY WITH PRESENT WORDING OF PARA 11. WE SUGGEST PARA 11 BE REVISED TO READ: "ALLIES INVOLVED IN NEGOTIATED INSPECTION SHOULD COORDINATE THEIR ACTIVITIES. ARRANGE-

MENTS MIGHT BE WORKED OUT IN NATO TO FACILITATE THIS COORDINATION
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AND DISSEMINATION TO OTHER ALLIES OF RESULTS OF VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES." WE DO NOT SEE NEED TO SPECIFY HOW NAC WOULD BECOME INVOLVED IN POLICY GUIDANCE FOR ADMINISTERING NEGOTIATED INSPECTION ACTIVITIES.

(D) RE PARAGRAPH 12: WE ASSUME WASHINGTON WILL BE REVIEWING SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THIS PARAGRAPH AS WRITTEN. HOWEVER, IF "NEGOTIATED INSPECTIONS ACTIVITIES" WAS SUBSTITUTED FOR "VERIFICATION

ACTIVITIES", THE PROBLEM MIGHT BE AVOIDED. OR PARA 12 MIGHT BE REVISED TO READ: EACH ALLY INVOLVED IN THE VERIFICATION PROCESS WILL KEEP OTHER ALLIES INFORMED OF RESULTS OF THEIR VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES.

(E) THE FIRST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 14 APPEARS TO IMPLY A REQUIREMENT FOR A DEGREE OF STRINGENCY IN FIRST PHASE INSPECTION WHICH WOULD ACTUALLY BE NEEDED ONLY IN THE SECOND PHASE. SINCE TIMING AND LINKAGE OF PHASES IS STILL UNDECIDED AND SUBJECT TO TACTICAL NEGOTIATING REQUIREMENTS, IT WOULD BE BETTER TO AVOID THIS "PRE-JUDGING" ISSUE SINCE PHASE II COMPOSITION IS UNDECIDED AND SINCE ALLIES AGREE MODALITIES AND EXTENT OF VERIFICATION SHOULD DEPEND ON CONTENT AND NATURE OF AGREEMENTS REACHED.

(F) PARAGRAPH 19 APPEARS TO SLIP VERIFICATION OF CONSTRAINTS UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF VERIFICATION OF REDUCTIONS WHICH COULD POSE PROBLEMS. WE WOULD SUGGEST THAT PARAGRAPH COULD BETTER READ: "THE ALLIES SHOULD NEGOTIATE VERIFICATION OF WITHDRAWALS AND POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS IN SUCH A WAY THAT AGREED UPON INSPECTORATES IN THE CENTRAL REGION ARE SUFFICIENTLY STAFFED AND HAVE SUFFICIENT FREEDOM OF ACTION FOR THIS ROLE, WITH A SECONDARY OBJECTIVE OF VERIFYING ANY AGREED COLLATERAL CONSTRAINTS. THE LATTER OBJECTIVE SHOULD NOT IMPEDE, HOWEVER, NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING THE FORMER."

(G) CHAPTER IV ON SPECIFIC MEASURES (STILL IN PREPARATION) SHOULD DRAW ON NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS AS WELL AS ANY CONTRIBUTIONS FROM MBFR WORKING GROUP.HUMES

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